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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal presents a question that appears to be an issue of first impression in 
Idaho. Ms. Baker was convicted, following a conditional plea of guilty, of one count of 
possession of a controlled substance under Idaho Code§ 37-2732(c). 
Ms. Baker was charged with possession of methamphetamine and possession of 
marijuana after she tested positive for these two substances. Ms. Baker asserts that 
she cannot be convicted for "possessing" controlled substances where the substances 
were found only in her body. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On December 26, 2011, Megan Baker gave birth to a baby girl, S.B., in Weiser, 
ldaho.1 (State's Exhibit 1, p.3; R., p.52.) After S.B. was born, Ms. Baker's urine tested 
positive for THC.2 (State's Exhibit 1, pp.6-7; R., p.39, 52.) During a well check visit by 
1 Ms. Baker waived her preliminary hearing, and the only evidence presented during the 
hearing on Ms. Baker's motion to dismiss were 35 pages consisting of the medical 
records of Ms. Baker and S.B. (State's Exhibit 1.) Both parties apparently were in 
agreement as to the facts, including that Ms. Baker admitted to using methamphetamine 
12 days before S.B. was born and that she tested positive for methamphetamine and 
THC several weeks after S.B.'s birth, on January 10, 2012, although there is no 
evidence in the record supporting these facts nor was there a formal stipulation by the 
parties. Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, the appellant will rely on the briefing for 
the motion to dismiss and representations of the parties made during the hearing to 
establish the facts of the case. 
2 The record is not clear whether Ms. Baker's urine tested positive for the substance 
tetrahydrocannabinol ("THC"), the active compound in marijuana, or whether it tested 
positive for "Carboxy-THC," a commonly found marijuana metabolite that is not a drug 
or intoxicating substance. See Reisenauer v. State, Dep't of Transp., 145 Idaho 948, 
950-951 (2008). As Ms. Baker's trial counsel identified the substance found in her urine 
only as "THC," Ms. Baker does not challenge the legality of the substance found in her 
blood pursuant to State v. Stark, No. 39885, 2013 WL 1338841(Ct. App. April 4, 2013), 
pet. for rev. granted (Idaho July 5, 2013). 
1 
the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare approximately two weeks later, on 
January 10, 2012, Ms. Baker was questioned about her drug use, and provided a 
sample to be tested for illegal drugs. (R., pp.39-40; 10/1/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-21.) When 
interviewed, Ms. Baker admitted to officers that she would test positive for marijuana 
and that she had used methamphetamine twelve days before S.B. was born. 
(R., pp.39-40; 10/1/12 Tr., p.8, 13-22.) The sample Ms. Baker provided was positive for 
amphetamines, methamphetamines and THC. (R., p.40; 10/1/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.15-21.) 
On April 16, 2012, the State charged Ms. Baker with one count of felony 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine and/or amphetamine, and one 
count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, marijuana. (R., pp.27-28.) 
Ms. Baker waived her preliminary hearing and the committing magistrate judge bound 
Ms. Baker over to answer to the charge in district court. (R., pp.25-26.) The State filed 
a Part II enhancement for a second offense under the Uniform Controlled Substances 
Act as Ms. Baker had a previous conviction, nine years prior, for delivery of a controlled 
substance. (R., pp.33-34.) 
Counsel for Ms. Baker filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (R., pp.39-41.) Ms. Baker argued that the mere 
presence of a controlled substance in her system coupled with a vague admission 
cannot amount to a sufficient legal basis to uphold a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance. (R., pp.39-41.) Ms. Baker asked the district court to adopt the 
majority rule in other states that the mere presence of a controlled substance in a 
person's body does not constitute possession within the meaning of the criminal 
possession of controlled substance statutes. (R., p.40.) Ms. Baker asserted that a 
defendant must have the power and intention to control a substance in order to be guilty 
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of possession of a controlled substance, therefore, once a substance has been 
consumed, there is no longer any power or any intent to control it. (10/1/12 Tr., p.7, 
Ls.11-20.) 
After hearing the arguments of counsel, the district court denied Ms. Baker's 
motion to dismiss. (R., p.59; 10/1/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-9.) In denying the motion, the 
district court stated: 
Well, although the Dickens character Mr. Bumble said in response to 
being informed that he is legally required to have control of his wife, that 
the law is as - the law doesn't need to be - the law is not required to be 
illogical or completely lacking in common sense. It sometimes achieves 
that end, but I think that reason and commonsense should rule the day, 
and I can't think of a more intense way to possess drugs than to have it 
inside your body so that you can test positive for it, so I'm denying the 
motion to dismiss. 
(10/1/12 Tr., p.9, L.19 - p.10, L.5.) The district court also noted that "I think the rule of 
reason should apply, and if others choose to be irrational, illogical, and lacking 
commonsense, I leave that to them. The motion is denied." (10/1/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-9.) 
Ms. Baker entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of felony possession of 
a controlled substance, preserving her right to challenge the district court's denial of her 
motion to dismiss on appeal; in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the 
misdemeanor possession charge and to limit its recommendation to an underlying 
sentence of seven years unified, with three years fixed, and to recommend probation, 
with a period of time in county jail. (R., pp.60-67, 69-70; 10/15/12 Tr., p.11, L.24 -
p.13, L.17.) The district court accepted Ms. Baker's plea and ordered a substance 
abuse evaluation, a mental health evaluation and a Presentence Investigation 
(hereinafter, PSI). (10/15/12 Tr., p.24, Ls.18-23.) The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction over Ms. Baker 
3 
for a period of up to 365 days. (R., pp.72-73; 12/3/12 Tr., p.42, Ls.5-8.) Ms. Baker filed 
a timely prose Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.75-79.) 
4 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err by denying Ms. Baker's motion to dismiss? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Baker's Motion To Dismiss The State's 
Information Due To A Lack Of Evidence To Support The Offense Charged 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Baker asserts that the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss 
the State's information as a charge of possession of a controlled substance cannot be 
proved based on a positive urinalysis combined with a defendant's admissions to past 
use. Specifically, the State failed to establish that Ms. Baker possessed the two 
controlled substances found in her body within the meaning of I.C. § 37-2732(c). 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Baker's Motion To Dismiss 
Ms. Baker filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 48(a)(2), 
which provides: 
The court, on notice to all parties may dismiss a criminal action upon its 
own motion or upon motion of any party upon either of the following 
grounds: 
(2) For any other reason, the court concludes that such dismissal will 
serve the ends of justice and the effective administration of the court's 
business. 
I.C.R. 48(a). "On its face, I.C.R. 48(a)(2) has two requirements: (1) that dismissal serve 
'the ends of justice,' and (2) that dismissal serve 'the effective administration of the 
court's business."' State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 781 (1999). 
In addition, this Court reviews the application and construction of statutes de 
nova. State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 177 (Ct. App. 2011). In doing so, this Court is 
obligated to give effect to every word and phrase within the statute, to avoid a 
construction that would render any portion of the statute a nullity, and to further avoid 
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treating any of the terms within the statute as mere surplusage. See, e.g., Bradbury v. 
Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116 (2009); Ephraim, 152 Idaho at 177; State v. 
Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the statute is not ambiguous, the 
appellate court is to give effect to the plain meanings of the terms in the statute. 
Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011). However, 
should the Court find that the statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires that 
ambiguity to be resolved in Ms. Baker's favor. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 
99, 103 (2008). 
In this case, there was insufficient evidence to support a charge of possession of 
a controlled substance under I.C. § 37-2732(c). The State alleged that Ms. Baker was 
in possession of controlled substances, methamphetamine and marijuana, because 
these substances were detected in her urine on January 10, 2012, and she admitted 
that she had used methamphetamine nearly a month earlier. (R., pp.52-53.) The State 
charged Ms. Baker with one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana and one 
count of felony possession of controlled substances pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(c). 
(R., pp.27-28.) The relevant portion of this statutory provision provides that: 
It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the 
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription 
or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. 
Idaho Code§ 37-2732(c). 
The "possession" language of I.C. § 37-2732(c), when applied to whether a 
person can "possess" a controlled substance when the substance is only found in the 
individual's blood or urine has not previously been interpreted by any Idaho appellate 
court and is therefore an issue of first impression. Construction and application of 
statutes are purely legal questions, and therefore reviewing courts exercise free 
7 
review. McGee v. J.D. Lumber, 135 Idaho 328, 332 (2000); Mitchell v. Bingham, 130 
Idaho 420 (1997). "The language of the statute has to be given its plain, obvious, and 
rational meaning." State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999). "Where the language 
of a statute is plain and unambiguous, th[e] court must give effect to the statute as 
written, without engaging in statutory construction." State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646 
(Ct. App. 2001 ). 
Ms. Baker does not contest that she tested positive for both methamphetamine 
and THC. What Ms. Baker does challenge is that the district court's conclusion that 
because methamphetamine and THC were detected in her urine and she told law 
enforcement that she used methamphetamine within the past month, she "possessed" 
controlled substances in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c). 
1. The Plain Language Of I.C. § 37-2732(c) Is Not Ambiguous 
The State could not prove that Ms. Baker "possessed" the methamphetamine 
and marijuana detected in her body. 
Once a substance enters a person's body, that person no longer has the ability to 
control the substance. See State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208, 211 (Kan. 1983); 
People v. Spann, Cal.App.3d 400, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Hornaday, 713 
P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986); State v. Da/ine, 30 P.3d 426, 430 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). In 
Flinchpaugh, the defendant moved to dismiss after the magistrate found probable cause 
at a preliminary hearing. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, and the State 
appealed. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d at 209. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the 
district court's decision, holding that evidence of a controlled substance in the 
defendant's blood did not establish possession of the substance; nor was it adequate 
circumstantial evidence to show prior possession by the defendant, since the drug could 
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have been injected involuntarily or introduced by artifice. The Kansas Supreme Court 
found that once a controlled substance is in a person's blood, the power of that person 
to control, 3 possess, use, dispose of, or cause harm is at an end, and thus evidence of 
a controlled substance after it has been introduced into a person's blood does not 
establish possession of that substance. Id. 659 P.2d at 211. 
Because that language of a statute must be given its plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning, "possess" is defined as "[t]o have in one's actual control; to have possession 
of." Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009). Further, "control" is given the ordinary 
meaning of the word, that is, "[t]o exercise power or influence over." Black's Law 
Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009). Ms. Baker did not have possession or control over the 
substances detected in her urine. 
Both actual possession (physical control over an item) and constructive 
possession (knowingly having control over the item) require the defendant have the 
ability to exercise control over the substance. See State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 
646 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that jury instruction defining actual possession as requiring 
"that a person have direct physical control over a thing" and defining constructive 
possession as requiring "that a person knowingly have the right of control over a thing" 
fairly and accurately reflected the applicable law); see also State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 
848, 855 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that instructions mirrored those given in Rozajewski 
and, therefore, were not erroneous). 
Here, once Ms. Baker ingested the substances, she ceased to have possession 
or control over the substances that had been assimilated into her body. Because the 
3 The Supreme Court in Flinchpaugh also examined the ordinary meaning of "control", 
finding it meant "to exercise restraining or directing influence over." Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
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State would be unable to prove that Ms. Baker physically possessed or controlled the 
contents of her urine,4 it would be unable to establish the element of "possession" and 
the ends of justice required the district court to dismiss the charges. I.C.R. 48(a)(2). 
Thus, the district court erred in denying Ms. Baker's motion to dismiss. 
2. District Court Erred By Not Reading The Statutes Prohibiting 
Use/Consumption Versus Those Prohibiting Possession In Pari Materia 
The Supreme Court construes statutes under the assumption that the legislature 
knew of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was 
passed. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999). Further, "It is a fundamental law 
of statutory construction that statutes that are in pari materia are to be construed 
together, to the end that the legislative intent will be given effect." Id. at 689-90 (citation 
omitted). The well established rule of in pari materia is as follows: 
The rule that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together means 
that each legislative act is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the 
same matter or subject. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to 
the same subject. Such statutes are taken together and construed as one 
system, and the object is to carry into effect the intention. It is to be 
inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by 
one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious 
in its several parts and provisions. For the purpose of learning the 
intention, all statutes relating to the same subject are to be compared, and 
so far as still in force brought into harmony by interpretation. 
4 While this Appellant's Brief contains a discussion regarding the inability of an 
individual to possess the substances found in one's urine, appellant does not maintain 
that an individual can never possess a substance inside his/her body within the 
meaning of the controlled substances statute. C.f State v. Rudd, 856 P.2d 699 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1993) (holding that evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant 
possessed controlled substances where defendant ingested receptacle containing 
controlled substances and contents were not assimilated, but rather were still within the 
dominion and control of the defendant as receptacle could be retrieved or expelled from 
the body). 
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Union Pac. R. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 103 Idaho 808, 811 (1982) (internal citations 
omitted.) 
The Idaho legislature chose to make illegal simply the presence of a controlled 
substance in an individual's blood. In 1996, the Idaho Legislature criminalized the "use" 
of controlled substances under I.C. § 37-2732C: 
"[i]t is unlawful for any person ... to use or be under the influence of any 
controlled substance specified [herein], except when administered by or 
under the direction of a person licensed by the state to dispense, 
prescribe, or administer controlled substances. 
I.C. § 37-2732C(a). 
This statute proscribes very different conduct than I.C. § 37-2732(c), depending 
entirely on whether the defendant is found to have "possessed" a controlled substance 
or merely to have "used" one. Whereas a finding of "possession" is a felony, and upon 
conviction, the defendant may be imprisoned for up to seven years or fined up to 
$15,000, or both, a finding of "use" is only a misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum 
fine of $1,000 and imprisonment in the county jail for up to six months. 
Statutes that are in pari materia, i.e., relating to the same subject, should be 
construed harmoniously, if possible, so as to further the legislative intent. State v. 
Gamino, 148 Idaho 827, 828 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Here, the consumption/use statute and the possession statute are codified within 
the same act, the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, and both serve to regulate 
controlled substances, thus reading them in pari materia is appropriate. See State v. 
Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 367 (1983) (holding that where both statutes dealt with the 
same subject matter, i.e., sentencing procedures, the Idaho Supreme Court was 
enjoined to compare and harmonize them). 
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Further, because the legislature has specifically enacted separate legislation to 
punish those individuals who have been using or observed as being under the influence 
of a controlled substance, this Court should find that "use" should not metamorphose 
into "possession." See I.C. § 37-2732C. The legislature enacted a "use" statute to 
provide criminal sanctions against an individual using or suspected of being under the 
influence of a controlled substance. The legislature, by its separate categorization and 
punishment of the offenses, has concluded that these are separate offenses, with 
separate elements.5 To find otherwise would negate the existence of I.C. § 37-2732C 
prohibiting "use" of controlled substances. 
Moreover, the legislature knew how to craft statutes where a defendant violates 
the law by having a specific amount of the substance in his/her blood, for example, the 
statue prohibiting driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating 
substances states: 
(1 )(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or any other intoxicating substances. . . or who as an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08, ... or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, 
urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
within this state. 
I.C. § 18-8004. 
The legislature could have easily written I.C. § 37-2732(c) to say "possess, or be 
under the influence of a controlled substance" to encompass those with a controlled 
substance in their blood or urine. Under such a set of circumstances, it would have 
been apparent the legislature was attempting to make it illegal to have a controlled 
substance inside a person's body. Instead, I.C. § 37-2732(c) provides: 
5 Separate statutes criminalizing possession and use/being under the influence have 
also been enacted in numerous other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Spann, Cal.App.3d at 
408; State v. Downes, 572 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Or. Ct. App. 1977). 
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It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the 
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription 
or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. 
Idaho Code § 37-2732(c). The statute is devoid of any reference to blood analysis or 
. language such as "under the influence," similar to what is set forth in I.C. § 18-8004, 
further indicating that the legislature did not intend to include those individuals with 
controlled substances in their blood within the scope of the possession statute. 
Further, the Idaho Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act provides that "drug 
addicts may not be subjected to criminal prosecution or incarceration solely because of 
their ... addiction to drugs." I.C. § 39-301. I.C. § 39-310 provides: 
(1) With the exception of persons below the statutory age for consuming 
alcoholic beverages and of persons affected by the provisions of 
subsection (3) herein, no person shall be incarcerated or prosecuted 
criminally or civilly for the violation of any law, ordinance, resolution or rule 
that includes drinking, being a common drunkard, or being found in an 
intoxicated or addicted condition as one of the elements of the offense 
giving rise to criminal or civil penalty or sanction. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall affect any law, ordinance, resolution, or 
rule against drunken driving, driving under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs, or other similar offense involving the operation of a vehicle, aircraft, 
boat, machinery, or other equipment, or regarding the sale, purchase, 
dispensing, possessing, or use of alcoholic beverages or drugs at stated 
times and places or by a particular class of persons, or regarding the 
carrying of a concealed weapon when intoxicated or under the influence of 
an intoxicating drink or drug, or regarding pedestrians who are under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs to a degree which renders them a hazard and 
who walk or are otherwise upon a highway except on a sidewalk, or 
regarding persons who are using or are under the influence of controlled 
substances or narcotic drugs and who are on public property, roadways or 
conveyances or on private property open to the public. 
(5) Nothing in this chapter shall affect the enforcement of any other 
provisions of the uniform controlled substances act. 
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Idaho Code § 39-310 (emphasis added). The Act eliminated the status offense of drug 
addiction in that it "establishes a system for the evaluation and treatment of alcoholics 
[and drug addicts] outside of prison facilities, and provides that intoxicated persons will 
not be subjected to criminal prosecution or incarceration solely because of their 
consumption of alcohol [or drugs]." State v. Hadley, 122 Idaho 728, 732 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding that the Idaho Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act eliminates the status 
offense of alcoholism and provides a mechanism for treatment, but it does not impose a 
requirement to provide treatment for alcoholics convicted of substantive crimes). Thus, 
the criminalization of drug addiction by prosecuting an individual found to have 
controlled substances in their urine seems contrary to the intent of the legislature in 
enacting the Idaho Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act, and actually appears to 
directly contravene the provisions of the Act.6 
Additionally, should this Court find that testing positive for a controlled substance 
is a crime, this would constitute a continuing violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c), such that an 
individual could be prosecuted for each day a positive test result was obtained. Further, 
it is anticipated that the State would have great difficulty establishing that the individual 
actually ingested the controlled substance(s) while within the State of Idaho, thus 
problems establishing the proper venue would likely arise. 
6 Further, such an interpretation would undoubtedly violate the United States 
Constitution, as the United States Supreme Court held in Robinson v. California that a 
statute making it a criminal offense for a person to be addicted to the use of narcotics 
inflicted a "cruel and unusual punishment," in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
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3. District Court Abandoned Proper Legal Analysis 
At the hearing on Ms. Baker's motion to dismiss, the district court prefaced its 
holding by stating that "the law is -- as the law doesn't need to be," thereby indicating 
the district court's intent to rule in nonconformity with established law. (10/1/12 Tr., p.9, 
Ls.22-23.) The district court further stated that it was disregarding the status of the law 
and decisions by others, and denied the motion, finding that it "c[ouldn]'t think of a more 
intense way to possess drugs than to have it inside your body so that you can test 
positive for it." (10/1/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-5.) The district court noted that it was applying 
the "rule of reason" in denying the motion. (10/1/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-7.) The district court 
thereby chose not to follow the principles of statutory construction and abdicated any 
reliance on established legal precedent in denying the motion. It appeared that the 
district court chose not to rely on legal authority and/or precedent, and instead set forth 
its "common sense" line of reasoning when interpreting the meaning of the possession 
statute and its application to the facts of this case. 
Idaho appellate courts have not previously addressed this question in light of the 
specific set of facts presented in this case. As referred to by Ms. Baker's trial counsel, 
the law regarding "possession" in other states may be informative. In People v. Spann, 
the California Court of Appeals rejected the proposition that possession of a controlled 
substance may be proven by its use, finding that after consumption the user no longer 
has dominion and control over the substance consumed and hence does not possess it 
"We agree for the obvious reason that a person is not in control of a substance that is 
en route through his digestive system." People v. Spann, Cal.App.3d 400, 403 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1986); see also Evans v. State, 132 So. 601 (Ala. Ct. App. 1931) (prohibition 
era case holding that whisky was not "possessed" when it "is in the man" after 
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consumption); State v. Downes, 52 P .2d 1328, 1330 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (phencyclidine 
(PCP) is not possessed by the user after it has been injected into his arm). 
The majority rule in other jurisdictions seems to be that the mere presence of a 
controlled substance in an individual's body does not constitute possession within the 
meaning of criminal statutes. See State v. Vorm, 570 N.E. 2d 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) 
(holding that the mere presence of a controlled substance in blood or urine is 
circumstantial evidence of prior possession, but insufficient to sustain a conviction 
without additional corroborating evidence); State v. Lewis, 394 N.W. 2d 212 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the usual and ordinary meaning of the term possession 
does not include substances injected into the body and assimilated into the system); 
State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986) ("Once a narcotic is injected into the vein, 
or swallowed orally, it is no longer in the individual's control for purposes of 
possession.")7; State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208 (Kan. 1983) (concluding that once a 
controlled substance is within a person's system the power of the person to control 
possess use dispose of or cause harm is at an end); State v. Thronsen, 809 P.2d 941 
(Alaska App. 1991) (holding that defendant could not be convicted of possession of 
cocaine "in his body"). 
Accordingly, this Court should hold that the district court erred in denying 
Ms. Baker's motion to dismiss because an individual does not "possess" a controlled 
7 The statute regulating controlled substance in Washington is substantively similar to 
the Idaho statute at issue in this case. See RCW 69.50.4013(1) (" It is unlawful for any 
person to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly 
from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the 
course of his or her professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this 
chapter.") 
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substance within the meaning of I.C. S 37-2732(c) when the controlled substance is 
found only in an individual's body. 
4. Alternatively, To The Extent There Is An Ambiguity Within The Statute, 
Pursuant To The Rule Of Lenity, It Must Be Interpreted In Favor Of 
Ms. Baker 
If this Court finds that I.C. § 37-2732(c) is ambiguous with regard to the 
"possession" language, the rule of lenity requires that it be construed in favor of 
Ms. Baker. "It is well-settled that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly and in 
favor of the defendant." State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365 (1996). "[A]mbiguity 
concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." United 
States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398,402 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 
U.S. 808, 811 (1971)). The United States Supreme Court spoke to the cannons for 
interpreting an ambiguous statute in State v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 (1990). The Court 
stated: 
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the 
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole 
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is 
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in 
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the 
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this "time-honored 
interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of 
the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define 
criminal liability. 
Id. at 1001-1002. As is acknowledged above, criminal statutes are promulgated on the 
premise that they give notice to society regarding the bounds of the law, one of the 
quintessential requirements of due process of law. Inherent in the concept of fair 
warning and due process, the general public cannot be on notice of what might have 
been the legislature's intent or policy behind drafting a statute. 
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The rule of lenity requires that in the interest of justice and to protect Ms. Baker's 
due process rights, this Court should refrain from ascertaining the possible intent of the 
legislature or the policies it might have had in mind in enacting the statute. Accordingly 
as is articulated herein, in order to show that Ms. Baker "possessed" the 
methamphetamine and THC within the meaning of I.C. § 37-2732(c), the State was 
required to show that Ms. Baker possessed-exercised dominion and control over-the 
methamphetamine and THC found in her system. Because the State had insufficient 
evidence to convict Ms. Baker of possession of controlled substances, the district 
court's order denying her motion to dismiss should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Baker respectfully requests that this Court vacate Ms. Baker's conviction and 
remand this case to the district court with an order that the district court grant 
Ms. Baker's Motion To Dismiss. 





SALL yr . C OLEY ) 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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